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SOCIAL MEDIA, THE SIXTH AMENDMENT, AND 
RESTYLING: 






The Federal Rules of Evidence affect lawsuits of all kinds, as 
well as the advice that lawyers give clients outside the courtroom.  
Any lawyer with an interest in the federal courts—or with a client 
who may one day appear in federal court—must keep abreast with 
the Federal Rules of Evidence. 
What is new in the rules this year?  Three developments 
dominated the federal law of evidence during the last twelve months.  
First, a fully restyled version of the federal rules took effect on 
December 1, 2011.  The Advisory Committee assiduously avoided 
substantive changes throughout the restyling project, but the 
amendments affect language in every one of the Federal Rules. 
Second, the Supreme Court further explored the Sixth 
Amendment‘s restraints on hearsay evidence offered against criminal 
defendants.  Building on its controversial decision in Crawford v. 
Washington,1 the Court examined two particularly challenging 
categories of statements: crime-scene declarations and laboratory 
reports.  Both cases produced split decisions and vigorous dissents, 
fostering uncertainty in this key area of law. 
Finally, social media raised new challenges in courtrooms 
across the country.  Lawyers and their clients can gain surprising 
 
* John Deaver Drinko/Baker & Hostetler Chair in Law, Moritz College of Law, The Ohio 
State University.  This article is based on a continuing education seminar delivered in April 
2011, but I have updated the material through December 1, 2011—just as the restyled 
Federal Rules of Evidence are taking effect. 
1 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
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amounts of information about adversaries from social media sites.  
These practices raise both ethical and evidentiary issues.  How freely 
may lawyers trawl the internet for damaging information about 
opposing parties, witnesses, and jurors?  If lawyers ethically obtain 
social media evidence, how do they authenticate that information in 
the courtroom?  In this article, I highlight key concerns about each of 
these issues. 
II. THE RESTYLED RULES OF EVIDENCE 
During the fall of 2007, the Advisory Committee on Evidence 
began a major project to restyle the Federal Rules of Evidence.2  The 
project aimed to make the rules more user-friendly by adopting easily 
readable formats, reducing inconsistent references, replacing 
ambiguous words, and eliminating redundant or archaic expressions.3  
After four years of work, revisions, and public comment, the restyled 
rules took effect on December 1, 2011. 
Many judges and practitioners view the new rules with mild 
trepidation.  Some fear that the restyling has inadvertently changed 
the substantive law.4  Others worry simply that they will have to learn 
a new vocabulary, eschewing phrases that have permeated the 
courtroom for decades.  Both of these fears are largely unfounded.  
The Advisory Committee screened all changes carefully to avoid 
substantive alterations.  As a safeguard, the committee appended a 
note to each rule declaring: ―These changes are intended to be 
stylistic only.  There is no intent to change any result in any ruling on 
evidence admissibility.‖5  The committee worked equally hard to 
maintain all sacred phrases of evidence law.  Attorneys will continue 
arguing about the ―truth of the matter asserted‖6 and objecting to 
 
2 The Advisory Committee is a standing group that oversees changes in the Federal Rules 
of Evidence, including the Rules‘ most recent restyling.  See DEBORAH JONES MERRITT & 
RIC SIMMONS, LEARNING EVIDENCE: FROM THE FEDERAL RULES TO THE COURTROOM 22-23 
(Thomson/Reuters 2d ed. 2011) (describing the committee‘s role). 
3 REP. OF THE JUDICIAL CONF. COMM. ON RULES OF PRAC. AND PROC. 29 (Sept. 2010) 
[hereinafter J.C.C. COMM. REP. 2010]. 
4 Edward J. Imwinkelried, Restyled Evidence Rules on Expert Testimony Coming, NAT‘L 
L. J., Sept. 27, 2011, available at http://www.nlj.com.  Cf. Edward A. Hartnett, Against 
(Mere) Restyling, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 155, 167 (2006) (describing arguments lawyers 
could have made to interpret the restyled Federal Rules of Civil Procedure differently). 
5 J.C.C. COMM. REP. 2010, supra note 3, at 30; see, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 801 advisory 
committee‘s note. 
6 FED. R. EVID. 801(c)(2) (keeping the quoted language after restyling). 
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―subsequent remedial measures.‖7 
While avoiding these pitfalls, the restyling project achieved 
its goal of producing rules that are much easier to understand.  Before 
restyling, for example, Rule 301 required readers to decipher this 
lengthy sentence: 
In all civil actions and proceedings not otherwise 
provided for by Act of Congress or by these rules, a 
presumption imposes on the party against whom it is 
directed the burden of going forward with evidence to 
rebut or meet the presumption, but does not shift to 
such party the burden of proof in the sense of the risk 
of nonpersuasion, which remains throughout the trial 
upon the party on whom it was originally cast.8 
The restyled rule still expresses a complex concept, but is much 
easier to digest: 
In a civil case, unless a federal statute or these rules 
provide otherwise, the party against whom a 
presumption is directed has the burden of producing 
evidence to rebut the presumption.  But this rule does 
not shift the burden of persuasion, which remains on 
the party who had it originally.9 
Both neophytes and seasoned trial lawyers should find the restyled 
rules much easier to apply than the older versions. 
After closely reviewing the restyled rules, I have identified 
just two changes that may significantly affect substantive law.  
Practitioners should also note an intentional amendment to Rule 
804(b)(3), the hearsay exception for statements against interest, that 
took effect in December 2010.10  I examine each of these changes 
briefly below. 
A. Rule 801(d)(2): Statements of an “Opposing” Party 
The restyling project may have inadvertently altered the scope 
of Rule 801(d)(2), which creates a hearsay exemption for statements 
 
7 FED. R. EVID. 407 (keeping the quoted language after restyling). 
8 FED. R. EVID. 301 (prior to restyling). 
9 FED. R. EVID. 301. 
10 FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3). 
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offered against another party.11  Before restyling, the rule broadly 
authorized admission of statements made by a party when ―offered 
against a party.‖  The ―against‖ caveat prevented litigants from 
introducing their own self-serving hearsay declarations in court.  But 
as long as a statement was offered ―against‖ some party by another 
party, the rule deemed the out-of-court statement fair game for the 
jury to consider. 
Parties usually invoke Rule 801(d)(2) to introduce a statement 
made by a party on the other side of the litigation.  Plaintiffs offer 
statements made by defendants, while defendants offer statements 
uttered by plaintiffs.  Occasionally, however, a party has interests 
adverse to those of a party on the same side of the litigation.  For 
example, criminal defendants in a joint trial may each blame the 
other. 
Before restyling, courts split on the application of Rule 
801(d)(2) to these ―same side‖ statements.  The First and Sixth 
Circuits admitted these statements.12  These courts noted that Rule 
801(d)(2) authorized admission of any statement ―offered against a 
party.‖13  The rule‘s text did not require parties to sit on opposite 
sides of the courtroom; it simply required a party to offer a statement 
―against‖ another party.  These courts also stressed the policies 
underlying Rule 801(d)(2): Although the exemption ―exclude[d] the 
introduction of self-serving statements by the party making them,‖ it 
supported admission of any statements ―contrary to a party‘s position 
at trial.‖14  If a party has made damaging statements outside the 
courtroom, these courts reasoned, any litigant with adverse interests 
should be able to offer those statements. 
The Second and Eleventh Circuits, on the other hand, read 
Rule 801(d)(2) more narrowly; they barred statements offered against 
a party on the same side of the litigation.15  These courts focused on 
 
11 FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2). 
12 United States v. Horton, 847 F.2d 313, 324 (6th Cir. 1988); United States v. Palow, 777 
F.2d 52, 56 (1st Cir. 1985). 
13 See Horton, 847 F.2d at 324; Palow, 777 F.2d at 56. 
14 Palow, 777 F.2d at 56 (citing Butler v. S. Pac. Co., 431 F.2d 77, 80 (5th Cir. 1970)). 
15 United States v. Harwood, 998 F.2d 91, 97 (2d Cir. 1993); United States v. Gossett, 877 
F.2d 901, 906 (11th Cir. 1989); see also United States v. Brown, No. 08-CR-1009, 2011 WL 
43038, at *12 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 6, 2011) (following Harwood and Gossett in the face of no 
contrary authority offered by the defendant); United States v. Ramirez, No. 06 CR 809, 2008 
WL 4344901, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 18, 2008) (following Harwood and Gossett with no 
discussion), aff’d, 574 F.3d 869 (7th Cir. 2009). 
4
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Rule 801(d)(2)‘s caption, which referred before restyling to an 
―Admission by party-opponent.‖16  A party on the same side of the 
litigation, the courts concluded, could not be a ―party-opponent.‖17  In 
reaching this result, the courts did not address the broader language in 
the rule‘s text or the policies underlying the rule. 
Restyled Rule 801(d)(2) alters the terms of this debate, 
favoring the latter rulings.  The Advisory Committee revised the 
exemption‘s caption to refer simply to ―An Opposing Party‘s 
Statement.‖  This was a welcome change, eliminating the confusing 
reference to an ―admission‖ and simplifying the awkward term 
―party-opponent.‖  The committee also added the word ―opposing‖ to 
the first sentence of the rule‘s text.  The hearsay exemption now 
admits a statement ―offered against an opposing party.‖18 
The restyled rule‘s text makes the position of the First and 
Sixth Circuits more difficult to sustain.  This is especially true 
because the Advisory Committee focused during the restyling project 
on the distinction between an ―adverse party‖ and an ―opposing 
party.‖  In other rules, the committee purposely chose the terms 
―party‖ or ―adverse party‖ to allow objections or evidence from 
parties on the same side of the litigation.19 
When the committee reached Rule 801(d)(2), it noted the 
Second and Eleventh Circuit decisions construing the reference to 
―party‖ narrowly.20  Relying in part on those decisions, the committee 
concluded that the exemption applied only to statements offered 
against a party on the other side of the litigation; to clarify this, it 
added the word ―opposing‖ to the rule‘s text.21  The committee, 
apparently, was unaware of the contrary decisions from the First and 
Sixth Circuits; this is understandable given the extraordinary number 
 
16 FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2) (prior to restyling). 
17 Harwood, 998 F.2d at 97. 
18 FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2). 
19 See FED. R. EVID. 606(a) (allowing ―a party‖ to object to juror testimony; before 
restyling, the rule referred to an ―opposing party‖); FED. R. EVID. 613 (substituting references 
to an ―adverse party‖ and ―adverse party‘s attorney‖ for references to ―opposite party‖ and 
―opposing counsel‖); Memorandum from Daniel Capra, Reporter, to the Advisory 
Committee on Evidence Rules 10 (Sept. 16, 2010), available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Agenda%20Books/Evidence/EV2
010-10.pdf, at 185. 
20 Memorandum from Daniel Capra, Reporter, to Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules 
123–24  (Apr. 1, 2010), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Rules 
AndPolicies/rules/Agenda%20Books/Evidence/ EV2010-04.pdf, at 193-94. 
21 Id. 
5
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of legal issues the committee researched during restyling. 
The restyled language fully supports precedents in the Second 
and Eleventh Circuits, but it raises difficult issues outside those 
circuits.  The decisions of the First and Sixth Circuits no longer fit 
comfortably within the rule‘s text: Will those courts adhere to their 
precedents on the ground that the restyling intended to make no 
substantive changes?  In circuits that lack precedent in this area, how 
will courts decide?  The restyled text strongly favors exclusion of 
statements offered against a party on the same side of the litigation, 
because courts usually do not deem those parties ―opposing.‖  On the 
other hand, proponents of these statements may cite the older rule 
language, persuasive authority from the First and Sixth Circuits, and 
the advisory committee note disclaiming any intent to alter the rule‘s 
substance.  The restyling of this rule, in sum, may generate 
substantive controversy.22 
B. Rule 1101(d): When Do the Rules of Evidence 
Apply? 
Restyling may also have changed the substance of Rule 1101, 
which defines when and where the Rules of Evidence apply.23  
Sections (a) and (b) of that rule provide that the rules of evidence 
apply broadly to ―cases and proceedings‖ in federal courts, but 
section (d) recognizes a number of situations in which the bulk of the 
rules do not apply.  The privilege rules bind these section (d) 
proceedings,24 but the other evidentiary rules do not.  In hearings 
governed by Rule 1101(d), the decision maker may consider hearsay, 
character evidence, and other information barred by the rules of 
 
22 FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2).  Some litigants may try to avoid this controversy by offering 
the statement under Rule 804(b)(3), the hearsay exception for statements against interest.  
FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3).  But this path is available only if the declarant is unavailable.  Id.  In 
criminal cases, moreover, the statement‘s proponent must demonstrate ―corroborating 
circumstances that clearly indicate [the statement‘s] trustworthiness‖ if the statement 
incriminates the declarant.  Id.  These requirements are considerably harder to meet than the 
simple standard of Rule 801(d)(2).  Indeed, Harwood and Gossett—the cases adopting a 
narrow interpretation of 801(d)(2)—also rejected admission of the statements under Rule 
804(b)(3).  Harwood, 998 F.2d at 98; Gossett, 877 F.2d at 906. 
23 FED. R. EVID. 1101.  Rule 101 declares the rules‘ general application ―to proceedings in 
United States courts,‖ but the restyling shifted all scope details to Rule 1101.  FED. R. EVID. 
101(a); FED. R. EVID. 1101. 
24 See FED. R. EVID. 1101(c) (―The rules on privilege apply to all stages of a case or 
proceeding.‖); FED. R. EVID. 1101(d) (―These rules – except for those on privilege – do not 
apply to the following . . . .‖). 
6
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evidence. 
Section (d) opens by naming grand jury hearings and a trial 
judge‘s Rule 104(a) determinations as situations in which the 
evidentiary rules do not apply.25  Provision (3) of section (d) then 
refers to a series of ―miscellaneous proceedings‖ that similarly fall 
outside the rules.  Before the restyling, section (d) of Rule 1101 read: 
(d) Rules inapplicable.  The rules (other than with 
respect to privileges) do not apply in the following 
situations: 
 
(1) Preliminary questions of fact.  The determination 
of questions of fact preliminary to admissibility of 
evidence when the issue is to be determined by the 
court under rule 104. 
 
(2) Grand jury.  Proceedings before grand juries. 
 
(3) Miscellaneous proceedings.  Proceedings for 
extradition or rendition; preliminary examinations in 
criminal cases; sentencing, or granting or revoking 
probation; issuance of warrants for arrest, criminal 
summonses, and search warrants; and proceedings 
with respect to release on bail or otherwise.26 
The language and format of the section suggested that the listed 
proceedings—including the specified ―miscellaneous proceedings‖—
were exhaustive rather than illustrative.  Except for the final two 
words of Rule 1101(d)(3), which modified only ―release on bail,‖ the 
rule‘s language offered no hint that the list was illustrative.  It 
appeared, instead, to offer a complete list of hearings in which the 
rules did not apply.  Policy concerns, furthermore, counseled a 
conservative interpretation of Rule 1101(d)‘s exceptions: Since the 
Rules of Evidence are designed to promote the fair administration of 
 
25 Under Rule 104(a), the judge makes factual determinations related to the admissibility 
of evidence.  FED. R. EVID. 104(a).  A judge, for example, may decide whether a statement 
was sufficiently excited to qualify for the excited utterance exception to the rule against 
hearsay. 
26 FED. R. EVID. 1101(d) (prior to restyling). 
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justice,27 judges should hesitate to hold hearings outside the scope of 
those rules. 
Before restyling, several courts embraced these reasons and 
construed Rule 1101(d) as an exhaustive list.  The Ninth Circuit, for 
example, observed that ―motion to suppress evidence proceedings are 
not enumerated in the exceptions to Rule 1101(b).‖28  ―Therefore,‖ 
the court concluded, ―the Federal Rules of Evidence are applicable to 
motion to suppress hearings.‖29  In a different context, a district court 
agreed that, ―The federal rules make themselves applicable except as 
specifically exempted.‖30  Yet another stressed that Rule 1101(d)(3) 
should be ―read . . . narrowly‖ and applied the federal rules to a bond 
forfeiture hearing.‖31  Because they read Rule 1101(d)‘s exceptions 
as an exclusive list, these courts applied the federal rules to any 
proceedings that did not appear on the list. 
At the same time, however, numerous courts interpreted Rule 
1101(d) more expansively.  Some courts reached this result 
deliberately, examining the rule and concluding that section (d) was 
not an exhaustive list.  One court in this camp buttressed its reasoning 
by pointing to Rule 1101(b), which stated before the restyling that the 
―rules apply generally to civil actions and proceedings, . . . to 
criminal cases and proceedings, to contempt proceedings . . . , and to 
[bankruptcy] proceedings and cases . . . .‖32  The word ―generally,‖ 
this court suggested, signaled that the rules did not apply strictly to 
 
27 FED. R. EVID. 102 (―These rules should be construed so as to administer every 
proceeding fairly, eliminate unjustifiable expense and delay, and promote the development 
of evidence law, to the end of ascertaining the truth and securing a just determination.‖). 
28 United States v. Brewer, 947 F.2d 404, 408 (9th Cir. 1991). 
29 Id.  See also id. at 410 (―We . . . conclude that the Federal Rules of Evidence apply in 
pretrial suppression proceedings pursuant to Rule 1101(d) because such evidentiary hearings 
are not expressly excluded under Rule 1101(d)(2) and Rule 1101(d)(3).‖).  The court 
suggested that its holding might be limited to ―a procedural rule‖ rather than a rule ―affecting 
the type of evidence that can be considered.‖  Id.  This caveat, however, rested in part on the 
court‘s confusion between motions to suppress and preliminary determinations governed by 
Rule 104. 
30 United States v. Veon, 538 F. Supp. 237, 249 (E.D. Cal. 1982) (applying the rules to a 
hearing on a criminal forfeiture restraining order). 
31 United States v. Vaccaro, 719 F. Supp. 1510, 1515-16 (D. Nev. 1989) (applying the 
rules to a hearing on bond forfeiture); see also United States v. Honken, 378 F. Supp. 2d 
1010, 1023 (N.D. Iowa 2004) (confirming that the language at the end of subsection (d) 
―does not create a ‗catchall‘ category of ‗miscellaneous proceedings‘ to which the Rules of 
Evidence do not apply.  Rather, that language modifies only conditions of release . . . .‖); id. 
at 1018 (applying rules to hearing about whether to shackle defendant charged with capital 
murder). 
32 FED. R. EVID. 1101(b) (prior to restyling). 
8
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every courtroom proceeding.33  Rule 1101(d)‘s list, following 
1101(b)‘s ―generally‖ caveat, could be read as illustrative. 
These courts also cited policy concerns to support an 
expansive construction of the exceptions in Rule 1101(d).  That 
section, for example, does not list hearings on the fairness of a 
proposed class action settlement; a strict construction of the rule 
would require courts to apply the full rules of evidence to those 
hearings.34  But imposing hearsay and other restrictions on fairness 
hearings might require courts ―to conduct a full trial in order to avoid 
one.‖35  As one district court judge observed in refusing to construe 
1101(d) narrowly in that context, ―[T]he very point of compromise is 
to avoid determining sharply contested issues and the waste and 
expense of litigation.‖36  Affirming that result, the Sixth Circuit 
declared, ―[N]o court of appeals, to our knowledge, has demanded 
that district courts invariably conduct a full evidentiary hearing with 
live testimony and cross-examination before approving a 
settlement.‖37 
In addition to these decisions, courts declined before restyling 
to apply the evidentiary rules to a variety of proceedings without 
directly considering the impact of Rule 1101(d).  Many courts, for 
example, applied the evidentiary rules loosely in class action fairness 
hearings, accepting affidavits and other hearsay evidence, without 
noting the possible impact of Rule 1101(d).38  These decisions, in 
both fairness hearings and other contexts, prompted the authors of a 
prominent treatise to conclude: ―Subdivision (d) is not a complete list 
of the situations in which the Evidence Rules are inapplicable.‖39 
During restyling, the Advisory Committee thus faced an 
 
33 UAW v. General Motors Corp., 235 F.R.D. 383, 386-87 (E.D. Mich. 2006), aff’d, 497 
F.3d 615 (6th Cir. 2007). 
34 See Mars Steel Corp. v. Continental Bank N.A., 880 F.2d 928, 938 (7th Cir. 1989) 
(―Fairness hearings . . . are not among the proceedings excepted from the Rules of Evidence.  
No case of which we are aware holds that Rule 1101(d) suspends the usual rules of evidence 
for fairness hearings; no case expressly holds that affidavits are admissible in such    
hearings . . . .‖) (dictum). 
35 Handschu v. Special Servs. Div., 787 F.2d 828, 834 (2d Cir. 1986). 
36 UAW, 235 F.R.D. at 385. 
37 Int‘l Union v. Gen. Motors Corp., 497 F.3d. 615, 636 (6th Cir. 2007). 
38 Mars Steel Corp., 880 F.2d at 938 (―[S]everal cases mention [the use of affidavits in 
fairness hearings] without deciding the propriety of that use.‖); UAW, 235 F.R.D. at 387 
(―Historically, courts have commonly relied on affidavits, declarations, arguments made by 
counsel, and other materials‖ in class action fairness hearings.). 
39 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., 31 FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 8077 
(Thompson/West ed. 2011). 
9
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unusual situation.  Rule 1101(d)‘s text seemed to create an exclusive 
list of proceedings exempt from the Federal Rules of Evidence, yet 
numerous courts had read the list as simply illustrative.  The 
committee‘s Reporter advised: ―It would seem useful to let the 
practitioner know that the rule is not exclusive.‖40  The Reporter 
suggested, and the committee approved, adding the introductory 
phrase ―such as‖ to the list of miscellaneous proceedings in Rule 
1101(d)(3).41  This addition changed the subsection to an illustrative 
list.42 
In recommending this change, the Reporter reasoned that 
adding ―such as‖ was ―not a substantive change because it simply 
recognizes, and does not attempt to change, the substantive law.‖43  
The Reporter and committee may not have known about the judicial 
opinions construing Rule 1101(d)(3) more narrowly.  Alternatively, 
they may have concluded that those decisions were not authoritative.  
Whatever the committee discussion, the restyled rule shifts the terms 
of a debate that was percolating in some courts.  Rule 1101(d)(3) now 
clearly allows judges to contract the proceedings in which the full 
evidentiary rules apply.  On the other hand, parties resisting that trend 
may cite the former rule‘s language and precedents predating the 
restyling; the committee‘s intent to avoid any substantive change 
gives life to those arguments.  As with the shift in Rule 801(d)(2), the 
restyling of Rule 1101(d)(3) may provoke some controversy in the 
courts. 
C. Rule 804(b)(3): Corroboration for Some 
Statements Against Interest 
Rule 804(b)(3), the hearsay exception for statements against 
interest, deserves special mention here.  The Advisory Committee 
proposed a substantive change in this rule while it was engaged in the 
broader restyling project.  The change was not a byproduct of 
 
40 Memorandum from Daniel Capra, Reporter, to Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules 
76 (Apr. 23-24, 2009), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAnd Policies/ 
rules/Agenda%20Books/Evidence/EV2009-04.pdf., at 171 [hereinafter Memorandum from 
Daniel Capra, Apr. 2009]. 
41 Id. 
42 The relevant portion of the section now reads: ―These rules – except for those on 
privilege – do not apply to the following: . . . miscellaneous proceedings such as . . . .‖  FED. 
R. EVID. 1101(d)(3). 
43 Memorandum from Daniel Capra, Apr. 2009, supra note 40, at 171. 
10
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restyling; it rested on independent grounds and received separate 
public comment and review.  Since the amendment took effect in 
December 2010, however, it has been overshadowed by the restyling 
project.  The amendment merits attention as one of the notable 
changes of the last year. 
Rule 804(b)(3) admits hearsay statements that: 
a reasonable person in the declarant‘s position would 
have made only if the person believed it to be true 
because, when made, it was so contrary to the 
declarant‘s proprietary or pecuniary interest or had so 
great a tendency to invalidate the declarant‘s claim 
against someone else or to expose the declarant to 
civil or criminal liability . . . .44 
Until December 2010, a final sentence of the rule limited a criminal 
defendant‘s ability to invoke the exception.  A criminal defendant 
could exculpate himself by offering a hearsay statement that exposed 
the third-party declarant to criminal liability—i.e., a statement against 
penal interest—only if ―corroborating circumstances clearly 
indicate[d] the trustworthiness‖ of the statement.45 
The rule imposed this limit to prevent abuses by criminal 
defendants.46  The Department of Justice and Congress feared that 
defendants might coax friends or family members to claim credit for 
the defendant‘s crime.47  An ally would run little risk of prosecution 
if he was, in fact, innocent, if no other evidence linked him to the 
crime, and if he avoided making the false confession under oath.  The 
guilty defendant, meanwhile, could use the ally‘s ―statement against 
interest‖ to create reasonable doubt about his own guilt.  To avoid 
this manipulation, Rule 804(b)(3) imposed a special corroboration 
requirement on criminal defendants.48 
 
44 FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3)(A). 
45 FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3) (prior to restyling).  Note that the corroboration requirement 
only applied to statements that ―expose[d] the declarant to criminal liability.‖  FED. R. EVID. 
804(b)(3)(A).  Rule 804(b)(3) authorizes admission of statements against other types of 
interest but those statements do not require corroboration—even in criminal cases. 
46 See FED. R. EVID. 804 advisory committee‘s note (indicating that ―statements of this 
type tending to exculpate the accused are more suspect and so should have their admissibility 
conditioned upon some further provision insuring trustworthiness‖). 
47 For discussion of Rule 804(b)(3)‘s legislative history, see Peter W. Tague, Perils of the 
Rulemaking Process: The Development, Application, and Unconstitutionality of Rule 
804(b)(3)’s Penal Interest Exception, 69 GEO. L.J. 851 (1981). 
48 See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3) (prior to restyling). 
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The 2010 amendment preserved this requirement, but 
extended it to statements against penal interest offered by prosecution 
witnesses.49  Numerous courts had reached this result before 2010, 
finding the one-way corroboration requirement unfair, inconsistent 
with other rules, and possibly unconstitutional.50  The Advisory 
Committee proposed amending the rule to extend the corroboration 
requirement to the prosecution and, despite earlier struggles over this 
change, the 2009 proposal took effect without opposition.51  Since 
December 1, 2010, prosecutors have had to show ―corroborating 
circumstances that clearly indicate [the] trustworthiness‖ of 
statements against penal interest when those statements are offered 
under Rule 804(b)(3).52  The change, however, does not affect civil 
cases. 
III. THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE 
The Sixth Amendment guarantees that ―[i]n all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted 
with the witnesses against him.‖53  The Confrontation Clause thus 
restricts the prosecution‘s power to offer hearsay evidence against 
criminal defendants.  Read literally, in fact, the clause seems to forbid 
all hearsay statements by declarants who fail to appear in the 
courtroom.  How can a defendant confront a witness who is not 
present at trial?  Yet some types of hearsay, such as business records 
compiled independent of any criminal investigation, do not seem to 
threaten the harms that the Sixth Amendment was designed to 
avoid.54 
 
49 FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3)(B) advisory committee‘s note. 
50 See, e.g., United States v. Franklin, 415 F.3d 537, 547 (6th Cir. 2005) (relying upon 
Confrontation Clause); United States v. Barone, 114 F.3d 1284, 1300 n.10 (1st Cir. 1997) 
(summarizing cases); United States v. Alvarez, 584 F.2d 694, 699-702 (5th Cir. 1978) 
(discussing legislative history of the exception and relying upon the Confrontation Clause).  
For an excellent overview of these developments, see Daniel J. Capra, Amending the 
Hearsay Exception for Declarations Against Penal Interest in the Wake of Crawford, 105 
COLUM. L. REV. 2409 (2005). 
51 See REP. OF THE JUDICIAL CONF. COMM. ON RULES OF PRAC. AND PROC. 29 (Sept. 2009) 
[hereinafter J.C.C. COMM. REP. 2009]. (noting that public hearings on the proposed 
amendment ―were canceled because no one asked to testify‖ and that ―[t]he Department of 
Justice does not oppose the amendments‖).  For discussion of the difficulties confronting 
earlier attempts to amend Rule 804(b)(3), see Capra, supra note 50. 
52 FED. R. EVID. 804(3)(B). 
53 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
54 For further discussion of this concept, see MERRITT & SIMMONS, supra note 2, at 699-
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The Supreme Court has struggled for more than thirty years to 
draw a manageable line between hearsay that violates a defendant‘s 
confrontation rights and hearsay that accords with those rights.55  The 
Court‘s current formula stems from its 2004 decision, Crawford v. 
Washington.56  In that case and its immediate progeny, the Court held 
that: (1) The Sixth Amendment gives criminal defendants a right to 
cross-examine witnesses who make statements against them, but (2) 
that right applies only to ―testimonial‖ statements.57  The Court, in 
other words, interpreted the Sixth Amendment to read: ―In all 
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to cross-
examine witnesses who make testimonial statements against him.‖  
Nontestimonial statements do not raise any Sixth Amendment 
concerns.58  Testimonial statements, on the other hand, are admissible 
only if (a) the defendant has an opportunity to cross-examine the 
declarant at trial or (b) the declarant has become unavailable, and the 
defendant had an adequate prior opportunity to cross-examine that 
declarant.59 
Under this formula, the admissibility of hearsay statements 
against criminal defendants depends primarily on whether a statement 
was ―testimonial.‖  A half dozen Supreme Court opinions—and 
hundreds of lower court ones—have grappled with this issue.  In 
 
700.  Much of the discussion in this section of the article appears in chapter 58 of that book. 
55 Near the beginning of this journey, the Court wrote: 
While it may readily be conceded that hearsay rules and the 
Confrontation Clause are generally designed to protect similar values, it 
is quite a different thing to suggest that the overlap is complete and that 
the Confrontation Clause is nothing more or less than a codification of 
the rules of hearsay . . . ; indeed, we have more than once found a 
violation of confrontation values even though the statements in issue 
were admitted under an arguably recognized hearsay exception.  The 
converse is equally true: merely because evidence is admitted in 
violation of a long-established hearsay rule does not lead to the 
automatic conclusion that confrontation rights have been denied. 
Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 81-82 (1970).  The Court has replaced Dutton‘s approach with 
the Crawford standard discussed in text, but the difficulties remain the same.  Id. 
56 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
57 Id. at 51;  Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 821-23 (2006). 
58 Davis, 547 U.S. at 823-24.  But see Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1162 n.13 
(2011) (―Of course the Confrontation Clause is not the only bar to admissibility of hearsay 
statements at trial. . . . [T]he Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments 
may constitute a further bar to admission of, for example, unreliable evidence.‖). 
59 See Davis, 547 U.S. at 821; Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53-54; cf. Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 
719, 724-25 (1968) (holding that the prosecution must make a good faith effort to secure a 
witness‘s attendance; it cannot simply declare that the witness is unavailable). 
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2011, the Supreme Court issued two important new decisions in its 
Crawford series: Michigan v. Bryant60 and Bullcoming v. New 
Mexico.61 
A. Michigan v. Bryant 
The Court‘s most provocative Sixth Amendment case of the 
year, Michigan v. Bryant, addressed the troubling question of crime-
scene statements.  Detroit police received a call that a man had been 
shot and was lying in a gas station parking lot.  The officers found the 
victim, Anthony Covington, seriously injured and in severe pain.  As 
the officers arrived at the scene, they each asked Covington ―what 
had happened, who had shot him, and where the shooting had 
occurred.‖62  Covington explained that ―Rick‖ had shot him about 
twenty-five minutes earlier through the door of a house located 
several blocks away.63  Covington also described how he used his car 
to drive to the gas station after the shooting. 
The officers spoke only briefly to Covington; ambulance 
workers arrived and Covington died several hours later at the 
hospital.  The police used Covington‘s information to locate the 
original crime scene and gather circumstantial evidence tying Richard 
Bryant to the murder.64  Even with that evidence, Covington‘s 
hearsay statements remained crucial to the prosecution; without those 
words, the jury probably would not have convicted Bryant.65 
Bryant‘s attorney argued that Covington‘s statement was 
testimonial so that its admission violated the Sixth Amendment.  But 
the Supreme Court, in an opinion written by Justice Sotomayor, 
rejected Bryant‘s claim.  Following its earlier decision in Davis v. 
Washington,66 the Court held that a statement is testimonial only if its 
 
60 131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011). 
61 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011). 
62 Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1150. 
63 Id. 
64 Police, for example, found blood and a bullet on Bryant‘s back porch.  They also found 
―an apparent bullet hole in the back door,‖ and Covington‘s wallet lying outside the house.  
Id. 
65 See People v. Bryant, 768 N.W.2d 65, 76 (Mich. 2009) (―[I]n our judgment, [admission 
of Covington‘s statement] clearly prejudiced defendant.  The evidence against [Bryant] was 
far from overwhelming and the victim‘s statement indicating that defendant was the one who 
shot him was obviously extraordinarily damaging. . . .  Further evidence . . . is the fact that 
defendant‘s first trial resulted in a hung jury.‖), vacated, 131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011). 
66 547 U.S. 813 (2006). 
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― ‗primary purpose . . . is to establish or prove past events potentially 
relevant to later criminal prosecution.‘ ‖67  If a statement has another 
primary purpose, such as ― ‗to enable police assistance to meet an 
ongoing emergency,‘ ‖ then the statement is nontestimonial.68  The 
Court stressed that the primary-purpose test is an objective one 
focusing on what a reasonable person would have believed under the 
circumstances.69  In Bryant, the Court added a new clarification: The 
judge must consider the perspectives of both the declarant and any 
other participant in the exchange when construing the statement‘s 
purpose.70 
Applying this formula to Covington‘s statement, the Court 
concluded that the primary purpose of the police questioning was to 
address an ongoing emergency.  When the police arrived at the scene, 
they did not know that the shooting had occurred earlier at a different 
place; they questioned Covington in part to determine the degree of 
immediate danger.  The questioning was ―disorganized,‖ and ―the 
situation was fluid and somewhat confused.‖71  Covington himself 
was mortally injured and had difficulty speaking; the circumstances 
did not allow him to offer the type of ―deliberately recounted‖ 
statements that were found testimonial in earlier cases.72  For these 
reasons, the Court held that Covington‘s statement was not 
testimonial. 
Justice Scalia delivered a scathing dissent, denouncing the 
Court as the ―obfuscator of last resort‖ and declaring that the majority 
opinion ―distorts our Confrontation Clause jurisprudence and leaves 
it in a shambles.‖73  Scalia further accused the majority of intending 
to overrule Crawford ―by a thousand unprincipled distinctions.‖74  
 
67 Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1154 (quoting Davis, 547 U.S. at 822). 
68 Id. at 1150 (quoting Davis, 547 U.S. at 822). 
69 Id. at 1156 (―[T]he relevant inquiry is . . . the purpose that reasonable participants 
would have had, as ascertained from the individuals‘ statements and actions and the 
circumstances in which the encounter occurred.‖). 
70 Id. at 1160-62.  As the Court conceded, previous rulings on this issue had been—at 
best—ambiguous.  Id. at 1160 n.11. 
71 Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1160, 1166. 
72 Id. at 1154 (quoting Davis, 547 U.S. at 830).  Although Covington was mortally 
wounded, the prosecutor abandoned any reliance on the ―dying declaration‖ exception in the 
lower courts; therefore, the Court did not consider whether the Sixth Amendment recognized 
a special exception for testimonial statements fitting that exception.  See id. at 1151 n.1; id. 
at 1176, 1177 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
73 Id. at 1168 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
74 Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1175. 
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Some commentators have sounded the same alarm, characterizing 
Bryant as a significant retreat from Crawford‘s principles.75 
Several Justices undoubtedly are hostile to Crawford; over 
time, the decision may succumb to their efforts.  But Bryant itself 
does not sound Crawford‘s death knell.  Despite the case‘s dramatic 
facts, it builds upon the Court‘s earlier rulings.  In Davis v. 
Washington, the Court approved admission of key information 
gathered by a 911 operator after the operator had already ascertained 
the victim‘s circumstances and dispatched police assistance.  The 
victim had reported her location and assured the operator that her 
assailant was unarmed.76  The operator responded, ―Okay, sweetie.  
I‘ve got help started,‖ and then asked the victim for the assailant‘s 
full name—including his middle initial.77  The victim provided that 
information and when she failed to testify at trial, the state offered the 
transcript of the 911 identification. 
The Court in Davis found that the police needed the 
perpetrator‘s identity so that they could determine whether he was a 
violent felon; that information would help them better respond to the 
emergency.78  That justification undoubtedly is true: Knowing an 
assailant‘s identity helps the police tailor their response to an ongoing 
threat.  But the information also provides critical evidence to convict 
at trial.  Davis, decided five years before Bryant, had already entered 
the murky waters of admitting victim identification statements 
gathered (1) while the victim was suffering distress, (2) through 
affirmative requests from law enforcement agents, and (3) during the 
initial stages of police response to an emergency call. 
Bryant certainly expands the circle of statements admissible 
under the Sixth Amendment: Several officers questioned Covington, 
and they continued their examination after Covington indicated that 
the assault had occurred several blocks away.  The decision gives 
 
75 See, e.g., Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., Michigan v. Bryant: The Counter-Revolution Begins 
1, 1 (UCLA School of Law Research Paper No. 11-07, 2011), available at 
http://escholarship.org/uc/item/5965p8g3# (―[T]he majority of the court . . . effectively over-
ruled Crawford . . . .‖); Richard D. Friedman, Preliminary Thoughts on the Bryant Decision, 
THE CONFRONTATION BLOG (Mar. 2, 2011, 12:42 AM), http://confrontationright. 
blogspot.com/2011/03/preliminary-thoughts-on-bryant-decision.html (―The approach that 
emerges is remarkably mushy, unjustified by any sound reasoning and virtually     
incoherent. . . .  [T]his decision strikes me as a giant step backwards towards a morass like 
that of Ohio v. Roberts . . . .‖). 
76 Davis, 547 U.S. at 817. 
77 Id. at 817-18. 
78 Id. at 827. 
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police significant freedom to stabilize a crime scene while also 
gathering evidence for trial.  Bryant, however, may mark the outer 
limits of police freedom rather than a turning point in Sixth 
Amendment law.  A recent New York decision suggests that at least 
some courts will refuse to expand state power beyond Bryant.  On 
facts quite similar to the ones in Bryant, the court held that a dying 
victim‘s identification of his assailant was testimonial because a 
police officer pushed for the response.79  After the victim failed to 
answer initial inquiries, the officer told him: ―I don‘t think you‘re 
going to make it.  Who shot you?‖80  The next few years will tell 
whether other courts impose similar limits on Bryant. 
B. Bullcoming v. New Mexico 
The Supreme Court‘s second Sixth Amendment opinion of 
2011, Bullcoming v. New Mexico,81 addressed the admissibility of 
laboratory reports prepared for use in criminal prosecutions.  Just two 
years ago, in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts,82 the Court held that 
these reports are testimonial.  The report in Melendez-Diaz was an 
affidavit describing the composition and weight of an illegal 
substance seized from the defendant.  The Sixth Amendment, the 
Court ruled, gave the defendant a right to cross-examine the 
laboratory technician who prepared the report; the state could not 
introduce the bare report unless the defendant waived his 
confrontation rights. 
In this year‘s case, Bullcoming, the Court first confirmed the 
testimonial status of laboratory reports prepared as part of a criminal 
investigation.83  The Court then rebuffed the state‘s attempt to send a 
surrogate witness—someone with no connection to the original 
analysis—to testify at trial.  The majority held that testimony from 
―an analyst who did not sign the certification or personally perform 
 
79 People v. Clay, 926 N.Y.S.2d 598 (App. Div. 2011). 
80 Id. at 600.  The court nonetheless admitted the statement as a dying declaration, finding 
that the Sixth Amendment created a ―founding era‖ exception for testimonial statements 
fitting that exception.  Id. at 608.  The record in Bryant, unfortunately, prevented the 
Supreme Court from pursuing this possible ground of decision.  Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1151 
n.1.  The result in Clay suggests that lower courts might interpret Bryant as a decision 
strongly influenced by the dying-declaration exception and that they might limit the 
precedent accordingly.  See Clay, 926 N.Y.S.2d at 608. 
81 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011). 
82 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009). 
83 131 S. Ct. at 2709. 
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or observe the performance of the [reported] test‖ could not satisfy 
the defendant‘s confrontation rights.84 
Bullcoming signals the continued vitality of Crawford—at 
least until the Court speaks again.  The opinion also affirms 
application of the Sixth Amendment to laboratory reports, a common 
category of evidence in criminal prosecutions.  The decision, 
however, also highlights several open issues related to those reports.  
Justice Sotomayor, whose vote was necessary to support the majority, 
noted that Bullcoming did not involve testimony from a ―supervisor, 
reviewer, or someone else with a personal, albeit limited, connection 
to the scientific test‖ documented in the report.85  Justice Sotomayor 
signaled that she might accept testimony from any of these witnesses 
to satisfy the Confrontation Clause.86 
More important, Justice Sotomayor observed that Bullcoming 
raised none of the special evidentiary rules that govern testimony by 
expert witnesses.87  Rule 703 allows any expert witness to base an 
opinion on inadmissible evidence—as long as ―experts in the field 
would reasonably rely on those kinds of facts or data in forming an 
opinion on the subject.‖88  Justice Sotomayor‘s observation thus 
suggests that, rather than introduce lab reports directly in criminal 
cases, prosecutors might rely upon expert witnesses to offer opinions 
related to matters addressed in the reports.  Few laboratory scientists 
work in isolation; most of them rely upon the work of other scientists 
when drawing conclusions.  Under Rule 703, therefore, a laboratory 
supervisor or other witness might be able to offer an expert opinion 
about matters reflected in another scientist‘s laboratory report.  The 
result, however, seems to violate the confrontation principles 
articulated in Crawford.89 
The Supreme Court will address this conflict during the 
current Term.  It has granted certiorari in People v. Williams,90 an 
 
84 Id. at 2713. 
85 Id. at 2719, 2722 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part). 
86 Id. (―It would be a different case if, for example, a supervisor who observed an analyst 
conducting a test testified about the results or a report about such results.‖). 
87 Id. (―We would face a different question if asked to determine the constitutionality of 
allowing an expert witness to discuss others‘ testimonial statements if the testimonial 
statements were not themselves admitted as evidence.‖). 
88 FED. R. EVID. 703. 
89 For further discussion of this conflict, see MERRITT & SIMMONS, supra note 2, at 794-
97. 
90 939 N.E.2d 268 (Ill. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 3090 (2011). 
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Illinois decision reviewing an expert‘s use of DNA laboratory 
reports.  The case will be decided by June 2012, so the coming year 
undoubtedly will bring still more Sixth Amendment developments. 
IV. SOCIAL MEDIA EVIDENCE 
Trial evidence reflects the world outside the courtroom.  In 
the nineteenth century, litigants relied upon paper documents and 
memories of oral discussions; in the twentieth, they introduced 
audiotapes of telephone conversations and videotapes from 
surveillance cameras.  All of those types of evidence are still with us, 
but the twenty-first century has added emails, web pages, text 
messages, and other electronic media.  The courts have already 
adapted evidentiary rules to many of those media,91 but new 
challenges arise each year.  I focus here on some of the issues 
generated by the newest wave of electronic communications: social 
media. 
Social media sites generate an enormous number of 
communications.  Facebook today claims more than 800 million 
users worldwide; in one day, the site hosted visits by more than 500 
million of those users.92  Twitter enjoys ―100 million active users,‖ 
who produce over 200 million tweets per day.93  And the internet 
hosts more than 174 million blogs, with more than 120,000 blogs 
added daily.94 
The sheer number of social media messages has made those 
communications an important force in the courtroom.95  In addition to 
the abundance of social media messages, four other factors have 
 
91 See, e.g., Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534 (D. Md. 2007) (offering a 
comprehensive overview of treatment of electronic media under the Federal Rules of 
Evidence). 
92 Facebook F8: Redesigning and Hitting 800 Million, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2011, 
http://latimesblogs. latimes. com/technology/2011/09/facebook-f8-media-features.html. 
93 Twitter Reaches 100 Million Active Users, N.Y. Times, Sept. 8, 2011, 
http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/ technology/2011/09/facebook-f8-media-features.html. 
94 See BlogPulse Stats, BLOGPULSE, http://www.blogpulse.com/ (last visited Oct. 16, 
2011). 
95 See Peter S. Kozinets & Aaron J. Lockwood, Discovery in the Age of Facebook, 47 
ARIZ. ATT‘Y 42, July/August 2011, at 43 (―Social networking sites . . . have become an 
increasingly useful source of evidence in litigation.‖); Leita Walker & Joel Schroeder, 
Eureka! Discovering (and Using) Social Media in Litigation, CORP. COUNS., March 7, 2011; 
Walker & Schroeder, Making Your Case with Social Media in Litigation, INTERNET L. & 
STRATEGY, Apr. 1, 2011, at 2 (noting wide range of cases in which social media evidence 
may be useful). 
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made these statements particularly significant items of courtroom 
evidence.  First, users of social media are surprisingly indiscrete.  
Members of online communities have revealed their sadomasochism 
and illegal drug use,96 violation of probation terms,97 possession of 
stolen loot,98 and other incriminating facts.  These statements bear on 
a wide range of civil and criminal claims. 
Second, social media statements are easy to find: The 
messages reach wide audiences and they persist.  People have always 
said outrageous things, but they whispered those things to a small 
circle of friends or family.  Today, electronic tracks remain long after 
human memories of a statement have faded.99  For litigants who 
know where to look, electronic trails lead to juicy admissions by 
opposing parties.100 
Third, many of these statements are easy to admit into 
evidence.  Although social media communications are out-of-court 
statements qualifying as hearsay, Rule 801(d)(2) creates an 
exemption for statements ―offered against an opposing party.‖101  If a 
litigant made the out-of-court statement and another party introduces 
the statement against that litigant, the rule against hearsay imposes 
few obstacles.102  Even if a non-party made the statement, social 
 
96 See, e.g., Dexter v. Dexter, No. 2006-P-0051, 2007 WL 1532084, at *1, *6 (Ohio Ct. 
App. May 25, 2007). 
97 State v. Pressley, No. 1CA-CR-08-0160, 2009 WL 2343139, at *1 (Ariz. Ct. App. July 
30, 2009).  Ironically, one term of probation was refraining from internet use without 
advance written permission.  Id. 
98 Dumb Crooks Boast on Facebook, Busted, HINDUSTAN TIMES, Nov. 22, 2010, 
http://www.hindustantimes.com/Cops-use-Facebook-to-nab-dumb-crooks/Article1-
629487.aspx.  See generally Kozinets & Lockwood, supra note 95, at 43 (―Many users of 
these popular sites catalogue their lives with surprising honesty and detail, without regard for 
the possible legal ramifications of their posts.‖). 
99 See, e.g., Walker & Schroeder, Making Your Case with Social Media in Litigation, 
supra note 95, at 1 (―The internet‘s not written in pencil[;] . . . . [i]t‘s written in ink.‖ 
(quoting THE SOCIAL NETWORK (Columbia Pictures 2010))); Nicolas P. Terry, Physicians 
and Patients Who “Friend” or “Tweet”: Constructing a Legal Frame-work for Social 
Networking in a Highly Regulated Domain, 43 IND. L. REV. 285, 298 (2010) (noting the 
persistence of content even when deleted by the original author). 
100 See, e.g., Kathleen Elliott Vinson, The Blurred Boundaries of Social Networking in the 
Legal Field: Just “Face” It, 41 U. MEM. L. REV. 355, 374 (2010) (―Facebook can be a 
treasure trove of information, not only for those with whom users intend to share, but also 
with outside entities, like employers and even legal authorities.‖). 
101 FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2). 
102 One exception occurs when a party attempts to introduce a statement against another 
party on the same side of the litigation.  See supra Part II(A) for discussion of recent 
developments on this issue. 
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media messages may qualify as excited utterances,103 present sense 
impressions,104 then-existing mental states,105 or another type of 
admissible hearsay.106 
Finally, social media evidence carries special weight in the 
courtroom because jurors take notice when one party catches another 
―in the act.‖  Seeing is believing, and social media evidence can 
dramatically illustrate guilt or liability.  Facebook photos, YouTube 
videos, and other social media allow the jury to witness directly an 
unfaithful spouse‘s romantic weekend, a defendant‘s malicious 
prank, or a personal injury plaintiff‘s malingering.107 
Facebook‘s primary founder, ironically, may have suffered 
from ―gotcha‖ evidence of this type.  Mark Zuckerberg and Facebook 
faced several lawsuits from people who claimed to have partial 
ownership of the company.108  According to the movie The Social 
Network,109 a somewhat fictionalized version of the Facebook story, 
Zuckerberg‘s opponents planned to introduce evidence of offensive 
blog comments that Zuckerberg posted during college; in that blog, 
Zuckerberg compared some of his classmates to farm animals.110  
Since the blog comments related to one of Facebook‘s predecessors, 
the comments might have been admissible in court.  Their brashness 
surely would have offended a jury; one of the lawyers in The Social 
Network suggests that Zuckerberg paid a premium to settle the 
lawsuits because of his indiscrete blogging.111 
 
103 See FED. R. EVID. 803(2). 
104 See FED. R. EVID. 803(1). 
105 See FED. R. EVID. 803(3). 
106 Note, however, that many social media messages contain statements by people other 
than the message‘s author.  These third-party statements constitute hearsay within hearsay, 
complicating admissibility.  See FED. R. EVID. 805 (stating that hearsay within hearsay is 
admissible only ―if each part of the combined statements conforms with an exception to the 
rule‖). 
107 See also Thomas C. Frongillo & Daniel K. Gelb, It’s Time to Level the Playing Field–
The Defense’s Use of Evidence from Social Networking Sites, 34 CHAMPION 14 (August 
2010) (Noting that ―in a murder case, a Michigan appellate court upheld the trial court‘s 
admission of photos of the defendant from his MySpace page in which he was holding a gun 
and displaying a gang sign‖). 
108 See, e.g., Facebook, Inc. v. Pac. Nw. Software, Inc., 640 F.3d 1034 (9th Cir. 2011); 
ConnectU LLC v. Zuckerberg, 482 F. Supp. 2d 3 (D. Mass. 2007), rev’d, 522 F.3d 82 (1st 
Cir. 2008). 
109 THE SOCIAL NETWORK (Columbia Pictures 2010). 
110 Mark Zuckerberg‘s Online Diary, Oct. 28, 2003, available at 
http://www.scribd.com/doc/538697/Mark-Zuckerbergs-Online-Diary (last visited Oct. 18, 
2011). 
111 THE SOCIAL NETWORK (Columbia Pictures 2010). 
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Less famous litigants have left even more damaging (although 
perhaps less expensive) social media trails.112  Parties who pursue 
those trails, however, must understand both the ethical constraints on 
gathering online evidence and the rules for authenticating that 
evidence in the courtroom.  In this section, I briefly explore both of 
these matters.113 
A. Professional Responsibility When Gathering Social 
Media Evidence 
Litigants and their attorneys have long gathered evidence 
outside formal discovery channels.  Ethically, lawyers are free to 
scout public venues for acts and statements that may benefit a client 
in court.114  Attorneys may also hire detectives to do that work.115  If a 
personal injury plaintiff plays tennis at a public park, the defendant‘s 
lawyer and agents are free to capture that action on film.  The same 
ethical rules apply to the online world: Litigants and their attorneys 
may scour data posted publicly on the internet for information that 
might be useful in court.116 
Damaging information is surprisingly easy to find on public 
 
112 See, e.g., State v. Bell, No. CA2008-05-044, 2009 WL 1395857, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. 
May, 18, 2009) (upholding conviction based in part on ―on-line conversations and email 
messages that took place through MySpace.com‖), appeal denied, 914 N.E.2d 1064 (Ohio 
2009); People v. Clevestine, 891 N.Y.S.2d 511, 513 (App. Div. 2009) (admitting evidence of 
defendant‘s ―[mis]conduct [which] was discovered when his wife accidentally found, on 
their computer in defendant‘s MySpace account saved instant message communications 
between defendant and the younger victim revealing sexually explicit discussions and 
indicating that the two had engaged in sexual intercourse‖). 
113 For discussion of other evidentiary issues related to social media, see Wendy K. Akbar, 
Evidence That Bytes: E-Discovery in the Age of Hidden Data, Clouds, Facebook, Twitter, 
and the Digital Family, 15 J. INTERNET L. 1 (2011); Beth C. Boggs & Misty L. Edwards, 
Does What Happens on Facebook Stay on Facebook? Discovery, Admissibility, Ethics, and 
Social Media, 98 ILL. B.J. 366 (2010); Timothy J. Fallon, Mistrial in 140 Characters or 
Less? How the Internet and Social Networking are Undermining the American Jury System 
and What Can Be Done to Fix It, 38 HOFSTRA L. REV. 935, 935-36 (2010); Jaclyn S. Millner 
& Gregory M. Duhl, Social Networking and Workers’ Compensation Law at the Crossroads, 
31 PACE L. REV. 1 (2011); Kathrine Minotti, Comment, The Advent of Digital Diaries: 
Implications of Social Networking Web Sites for the Legal Profession, 60 S.C. L. REV. 1057 
(2009); Caren Myers Morrison, Jury 2.0, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1579 (2011). 
114 William J. Stuntz, Lawyers, Deception, and Evidence Gathering, 79 VA. L. REV. 1903, 
1919 (1993) (―Antideception rules do not apply to tactics such as videotaping the public 
behavior of an opposing party or seeking out witnesses who might disclose things the 
opposing party reasonably assumed would remain secret‖). 
115 Millner & Duhl, supra note 113, at 11. 
116 Id. 
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sites.  Many users of social media do not understand the privacy 
settings on these sites; they may not realize that their posts are 
public.117  This misunderstanding does not taint evidence gathered by 
an opposing party.  Litigants who post carelessly on the internet are 
responsible for their words—just like litigants who speak too loudly 
in a restaurant or other public place. 
Parties can also lose control of communications shared 
through social media.  Social media contacts, like Facebook friends, 
may forward statements to people outside the author‘s immediate 
circle.  If the ―friend‖ holds a grudge against the statement‘s author, 
or sympathizes with an adversary‘s lawsuit, he may even forward 
statements directly to the opposition.  Users of social media cannot 
control their electronic statements any more than they control their 
oral ones; recipients of information can, and often do, share that 
information with others.  If information falls into a litigant‘s hands 
through voluntary acts of third parties, ethical rules usually allow the 
litigant to use the information. 
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct, on the other hand, 
clearly forbid lawyers from using deception to gather evidence.118  
That prohibition includes misrepresentations used to gather social 
media information.  An attorney, for example, may not pretend to be 
an adverse witness‘s high school classmate to gain ―friend‖ status on 
the witness‘s Facebook page.119  Lies online are just as unethical as 
lies face-to-face.120 
 
117 See Leora Maccabee, Professional Facebook Privacy in Under 10 Minutes, 
LAWYERIST.COM, http://lawyerist.com/professional-facebook-privacy-in-under-10-minutes 
(last visited Nov. 2, 2011) (observing that many social network users are unaware of how to 
properly use the privacy settings on Facebook). 
118 MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 4.1 (2011) (―In the course of representing a 
client a lawyer shall not knowingly:  (a) make a false statement of material fact or law to a 
third person . . . .‖); MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 8.4 (2011) (―It is professional 
misconduct for a lawyer to . . . (c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or 
misrepresentation . . . .‖). 
119 New York City Bar Ass‘n Comm. on Prof‘l & Judicial Ethics, Formal Op. 2010-2 
(2010), available at http://www.nycbar.org/ethics/ethics-opinions-local/2010-opinions/786-
obtaining-evidence-from-social-networking-websites. 
120 Some commentators have advanced thoughtful arguments supporting deception in at 
least some forms of evidence gathering.  See, e.g., David B. Isbell & Lucantonio N. Salvi, 
Ethical Responsibility of Lawyers for Deception by Undercover Investigators and 
Discrimination Testers: An Analysis of the Provisions Prohibiting Misrepresentation Under 
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 8 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 791 (1995); Stuntz, supra 
note 114.  In-person lies, in other words, may not always be wrong.  I put those nuanced 
arguments aside here, however, to address the basic principles governing the ethics of 
gathering evidence online. 
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What if the lawyer uses her true identity to seek friend status 
with an adversary‘s witness, but omits information about her 
connection to the lawsuit?  Does the lawyer have an affirmative 
obligation to disclose her litigation interest?  The Philadelphia Bar 
Association recently advised that a lawyer must disclose the litigation 
connection.121  Omitting that information, the committee concluded, 
was ―deceptive‖ conduct violating the state bar‘s version of Model 
Rule 8.4(c).122  The attorney‘s connection to the lawsuit, the 
committee reasoned, is ―a highly material fact‖ that a lawyer may not 
omit to ―induc[e] the witness to allow access‖ to a social media 
site.123 
But the New York City Bar Association interprets an 
attorney‘s ethical responsibilities differently.  That bar‘s Committee 
on Professional and Judicial Ethics concluded that an attorney may 
withhold strategic information when seeking litigation-related 
information through social network sites.124  ―[A]n attorney or her 
agent may use her real name and profile to send a ‗friend request‘ to 
obtain information from an unrepresented person‘s social networking 
website,‖ the New York committee advised.125  As long as the 
attorney speaks truthfully and avoids contact with individuals 
represented by counsel, she may withhold material information from 
online contacts. 
Stephen Gillers, a prominent scholar of legal ethics, agrees 
with the New York committee‘s conclusion.126  The truthful friend 
request, Gillers observes, ―is no different than if a lawyer or 
investigator learns that a witness typically hangs out at a bar on 
Saturday nights, and the investigator sidles up to the witness and 
starts a conversation.  If the investigator doesn‘t misrepresent himself 
or his purpose, then it‘s OK.‖127 
Practicing lawyers will take little comfort from these 
 
121 Phila. Bar Ass‘n Comm. on Prof‘l Guidance, Op. 2009-02 (2009). 
122 Id. at 2. 
123 Id. at 3. 
124 New York City Bar Ass‘n Comm., supra note 119. 
125 Id. 
126 Steven Seidenberg, Seduced: For Lawyers, the Appeal of Social Media Is Obvious.  
It’s Also Dangerous, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1, 2011, at 48, available at 
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/seduced_for_lawyers_the_appeal_of_social_m
edia_is_obvious_dangerous. 
127 Id.; see also The Ethics of Using a Facebook Mole, ETHICS ALARMS, 
http://ethicsalarms.com/2010/07/13/the-ethics-of-using-a-facebook-mole/ (July 13, 2010, 
12:51 PM) (discussing lawyer reactions to these ethics opinions). 
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conflicting ethical opinions—unless, perhaps, they live in New York 
City.  The dispute reveals our uncertainty about social media 
contacts.  Are these communications just like face-to-face ones in 
local bars?  Or do they carry different connotations and risks?  
Controversy will continue until we are more comfortable with both 
the use and ethics of social media statements. 
B. Authentication 
Authentication is the first step to admitting evidence in the 
courtroom.  The proponent of the evidence ―must produce evidence 
sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the proponent 
claims it is.‖128  This standard is a low one—it does not require 
parties to offer proof beyond a reasonable doubt or even by a 
preponderance of the evidence.129  Instead, authentication imposes a 
simple prima facie standard: The proponent only needs to introduce 
evidence ―sufficient to support a finding‖ of authenticity.130 
Authentication is straightforward for most types of courtroom 
evidence.  Rule 901 offers an extensive list of ways to authenticate 
evidence, while Rule 902 describes twelve categories of documents 
that are self-authenticating.  These lists are not exclusive: Parties may 
choose any reasonable method to show that an ―item is what [the 
party] claims it is.‖131 
Despite these liberal standards, judges approach social media 
evidence with trepidation.  The anonymity of the internet, combined 
with the ephemeral nature of some communications, makes some 
judges wary of accepting social media statements at face value.132  
Judges worry about hackers, impersonators, and other virtual 
interference that may compromise the integrity of social media 
evidence.133 
 
128 FED. R. EVID. 901(a). 
129 MERRITT & SIMMONS, supra note 2, at 884. 
130 See id.  This section draws generally upon chapter 69 of that book. 
131 FED. R. EVID. 901(a); see MERRITT & SIMMONS, supra note 2, at 885. 
132 Judge Samuel B. Kent of the United States District Court for the Southern District of 
Texas registered one of the most colorful reservations about electronic evidence:  ―Anyone 
can put anything on the Internet. . . . Moreover, the Court holds no illusions that hackers can 
adulterate the content on any web-site from any location at any time.  For these reasons, any 
evidence procured off the Internet is . . . . voodoo information . . . .‖  St. Clair v. Johnny‘s 
Oyster & Shrimp, Inc., 76 F. Supp. 2d 773, 775 (S.D. Tex. 1999). 
133 But see Commonwealth v. Koch, 2011 PA Super. 201 (Sept. 16, 2011) (―[W]e rejected 
the argument that e-mails or text messages are inherently unreliable due to their relative 
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The key to overcoming this reluctance lies in recognizing that 
most pieces of social media evidence consist of two parts: the content 
and the tangible download.  Content refers to the original 
communication.  Most often, that content exists in the internet cloud; 
it can be viewed only through a computer, cell phone, or other 
electronic device.  Trial attorneys, however, rarely offer fact finders a 
direct glimpse of that cloud.  It would be cumbersome—and 
inconvenient—to admit a computer or cell phone, programmed to 
show a relevant social media message, into evidence. 
Most often, litigants introduce a tangible download of the 
original message.  This download is a snapshot of the social media 
communication.  It may be a printout of a text message, a 
downloaded copy of a video, or a literal screenshot of a website.  The 
tangible download of a social media message is analogous to a photo 
of an accident scene: It depicts relevant content at a particular time. 
Both components of social media evidence must be 
authenticated: The proponent must introduce evidence ―sufficient to 
support a finding‖ (1) that the original communication is what the 
proponent claims and (2) that the tangible download accurately 
reflects the original message.  A plaintiff offering evidence of a 
defendant‘s blog post, for example, must offer proof ―sufficient to 
support a finding‖ that the defendant was the person who posted the 
information and that a screenshot of the blog accurately reflects the 
post.  Sometimes the same evidence will accomplish both ends, but a 
litigant must focus on meeting both goals. 
To meet the first authentication task, parties may invoke a 
large number of methods.  One way to authenticate evidence is to 
present testimony from a ―Witness with Knowledge.‖134  A libel 
plaintiff could authenticate a defamatory Facebook message, for 
example, by obtaining the defendant‘s admission that he made the 
post; the defendant is someone who knows what he posted.  If 
another person saw the defendant make the offending post, that 
person is also a ―Witness with Knowledge‖ who can authenticate the 
post as one made by the defendant. 
When a ―Witness with Knowledge‖ is not available, parties 
 
anonymity and the difficulty in connecting them to their author.  We reasoned that the same 
uncertainties exist with written documents: ‗A signature can be forged; a letter can be typed 
on another‘s typewriter; distinct letterhead stationary can be copied or stolen.‘ ‖ (quoting In 
re F.P., 878 A.2d 91, 95 (Pa. Super. 2005))). 
134 FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(1). 
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often turn to ―Distinctive Characteristics‖ of the evidence for 
authentication.  Rule 901(b)(4) recognizes that litigants may 
authenticate evidence by pointing to ―[t]he appearance, contents, 
substance, internal patterns, or other distinctive characteristics of the 
item, taken together with all the circumstances.‖135  If a social media 
user publishes a message under her own name, the name itself may 
be a ―distinctive characteristic[]‖ sufficient to authenticate the 
message.136 
Even when a social media user adopts a screen name, 
distinctive characteristics may help authenticate the communication.  
The user‘s geographic location, birthday, educational degrees, and 
other posted information may offer prima facie evidence sufficient to 
identify the individual.137  The message‘s content may also contribute 
to authentication.  If a social media user employs idiosyncratic 
expressions or recounts information known only to a particular 
person, those characteristics may also authenticate the message. 
Methods like these will satisfy the first authentication step, 
tying the message to a particular person, time, and place.  To satisfy 
the second step, the proponent must establish that a particular 
download accurately represents the electronic communication.  
Parties often satisfy this requirement by presenting a written affidavit 
from the person who made the download.138  That person is a 
―Witness with Knowledge‖ of the download process.  If an opponent 
challenges the affidavit, the person who created the download may 
also testify live. 
In many civil cases, parties use pretrial stipulations to satisfy 
both levels of authentication.  The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
require civil litigants to disclose both evidence and objections before 
 
135 FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(4). 
136 Cf. United States v. Safavian, 435 F. Supp. 2d 36, 40 (D.D.C. 2006) (emails may be 
authenticated by ―distinctive characteristics‖ such as ―the name of the person connected to 
the address, . . . the name of the sender or recipient in the bodies of the e-mail, in the 
signature blocks at the end of the e-mail, . . . and by signature of the sender‖). 
137 See Michelle Sherman, The Anatomy of a Trial with Social Media and the Internet, 14 
J. Internet L. 1, 14 (2011) (giving example of authentication based on a photo, nickname, 
and family circumstances).  Farsighted counsel often seeks this type of background 
information during discovery, because it will help authenticate any social media 
communications.  Id. at 9. 
138 See In re Homestore.com, Inc. Sec. Litig., 347 F. Supp. 2d 769, 782–83 (C.D. Cal. 
2004) (finding that mere ―[p]rintouts from a web site‖ are not enough for authentication 
purposes; rather, a ―statement or affidavit from someone with knowledge is required‖); 
David I. Schoen, The Authentication of Social Media Postings, PROOF, May 2011, at 6 
(discussing affidavits and other methods of authenticating social media). 
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trial.139  These provisions, combined with the trial judge‘s 
admonitions to streamline the presentation of evidence, encourage 
many civil litigants to stipulate authenticity.  Stipulations are less 
common in criminal trials, although the government and defense 
sometimes agree to authenticity before trial.  In either context, 
familiarity with authentication processes is essential to evaluate the 
wisdom of stipulations and, if necessary, to authenticate the evidence 
in the courtroom.140 
V. CONCLUSION 
Evidence law reflects the text of the formal rules, the 
constraints of constitutional law, and the conventions of everyday 
life.  All three of these forces modified the federal law of evidence 
during 2011.  The tectonic shifts of the last year, moreover, will 
reverberate through the year to come.  In 2012, courts will apply the 
restyled rules of evidence, interpret the Supreme Court‘s latest Sixth 
Amendment cases, and continue to grapple with social media 
evidence.  These trends undoubtedly will make 2012 another lively 
year for the federal law of evidence. 
 
 
139 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(3)(B). 
140 For further discussion of authentication of electronically stored information, including 
social media messages, see generally Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534 (D. 
Md. 2007); State v. Thompson, 777 N.W.2d 617 (N.D. 2010); Commonwealth v. Koch, 
2011 PA Super. 201 (Sept. 16, 2011); Paul W. Grimm et al., Back to the Future: Lorraine v. 
Markel American Insurance Co. and New Findings on the Admissibility of Electronically 
Stored Information, 42 AKRON L. REV. 357 (2009). 
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